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Introduction 
‘‘Civil society’ has become an important term within the discourse and practice of 
contemporary development.1 In this chapter we examine attempts by Western states and 
development agencies to ‘support’ and ‘encourage’ civil society in two African states: Ghana 
and Sierra Leone. These cases, while very different, nonetheless exemplify some of the 
typical forms of interventions that target ‘civil society’ in African states. Our discussion of 
these interventions is informed by an understanding of the broad project of reform that 
western states and development agencies are attempting in most African states, which we 
have called, following Margaret Canovan, a liberal project (Canovan 1990; Young 2002; 
Williams 2008). This phrase seems to us to better capture the general character of liberalism, 
moving beyond understanding it as simply a body of theory (although it does, of course, take 
a theoretical form) to understanding it as a project of social transformation which informs the 
concrete practices of political agents. One form this project of transformation takes is a 
variety of strategies to ‘engineer’ civil society: to construct and reconstruct social groups and 
their relations with the state.  
 
This account rests on a series of claims about the relationship between political concepts, 
categories and arguments and the activity of political agents, an account which is to be 
distinguished from at least two other possibilities. Firstly, we reject the view that the 
activities of these agencies can be fully understood simply by reference to their ‘interests’ or 
the interests of powerful states. There are very significant difficulties with conceiving of an 
agency devoid of any ‘ideas’, even if it is only ideas about what is in one’s interests, and 
why. If this is right the question is not ‘do ideas matter?’ but ‘which ideas matter?’ And this 
is an empirical question. Secondly our focus is narrower than one that explores the broad 
discursive structures that shape the activities of development agencies (Escobar 1995). Our 
understanding of liberalism as a project leads us to focus more precisely on the particular 
concepts, arguments, tensions and ambiguities found within it as a way of understanding the 
activities of contemporary development agencies.  
 
In developing this account we first explore the place of civil society within liberal thought 
suggesting that its conceptual ambiguities are rooted in a fundamental tension between what 
might be called a ‘liberation narrative’ and a ‘transformation narrative’; that is to say between 
creating the conditions for the flourishing of social groups and engineering such groups in the 
first place. We highlight three of these ambiguities: a tension between private interests and 
the public interest; concerns about which groups constitute civil society and the composition 
of those groups; and the relationship between civil society groups and the state, notably the 
idea of accountability. We suggest these ambiguities become more explicable when 
liberalism is viewed as a political project. We turn then to the discourses and practices of 
western agencies, reviewing the way in which the term ‘civil society’ emerged and its place 
within donor discourse, and suggesting that much of this discourse tracks the ways that 
liberal thought has conceptualized ‘civil society’. Finally our case studies show how donor 
activities reflect the ambiguities of civil society as a concept as well as the broader political 
project of liberalism. In the conclusion we suggest some ways in which donors concerns with 
civil society may be shifting. 
 
Civil Society and the Liberal Project  
Although we cannot attend to its complexities here it is worth noting that the virtually 
hegemonic contemporary definitions of civil society as associational life have tended to 
obscure the range of meanings and practices that liberalism has understood by the term. Both 
the idea of ‘the market’ and the ‘public sphere’ remain essential concepts in the way 
liberalism thinks about how free, equal and rational beings form and maintain social orders 
appropriate to their nature.2 In all its various manifestations civil society has been understood 
to have a number of common features (Chambers and Kymlicka 2002). First it exemplifies 
liberal commitments to freedom and equality constituting an arena(s) within which 
individuals can pursue their own particular projects through freely associating with others. In 
this way civil society is a plural realm comprising a wide variety of groups pursuing a wide 
variety of ends. Second, as a space of free debate and criticism it provides a constraint on the 
power of the state. The expression of diverse views and opinions within civil society makes it 
possible to hold the state accountable, benefits the policy-making process and provides a 
bulwark against the ‘tyranny of the majority’. Third, civil society is conceived of as a place 
for the cultivation of certain attitudes and virtues that are important for sustaining liberal 
social life. These include law-abidingness, cooperation, tolerance and self-reliance 
(Rosenblum 1989). These understandings shape the familiar liberal account of the relations 
between state, society, economy and individual in which individuals are free to pursue their 
economic and political aspirations and enabled both to cultivate the virtues that make such a 
society work, as well as ensure that the state, while carrying out necessary public functions, 
does not become oppressive or its agents corrupt.  
 
Within this account there is however a tension between a liberation narrative in which civil 
society ‘emerges’ (because it is in a sense ‘already there’) from the removal of oppressive 
social structures, practices and ideas; and a transformation narrative in which civil society, far 
from being ‘there’, has to be both constructed and sustained. This tension characterises all the 
core Liberal concepts (notably ‘the individual’ and ‘the market’) and reflects the central 
ambiguity within liberal thought between ‘nature’ or ‘reason’, on the one hand and ‘culture’ 
or ‘society’ on the other: between liberating what is already there – given in human nature or 
reason – or constructing liberal ends and arrangements from the ground up as it were. This 
tension can be seen in many ways. It is manifest, for example, in the varied theoretical 
devices used in liberal thought to justify liberal ends and arrangements that ‘strip out’ the 
actual lived lives of people and groups to ‘discover’ their real nature. At the same time, 
however, liberal thought is replete with discussions about how influenced people actually are 
by ‘custom’, ‘trust’ and ‘interest’  (to use Locke’s terms: Locke 1993). In other words, people 
were very often not at all like the more abstract person used to justify liberal ends.  Appeals 
to ‘nature’ or ‘reason’ might ground liberal arguments, but when it came to making liberal 
ends and arrangements real in the world, the actual lived lives of persons and groups would 
have to be remade. 
 
Against this background a number of difficulties in liberal concepts of civil society can be 
identified. The first issue concerns how a sphere in which particular private interests are 
pursued through associational life can at the same time be a sphere where the public interest 
is advanced and protected. The key question here is the extent to which civil society can be 
relied upon to sustain a liberal order, or to what extent there must be other guarantees, in for 
example the legal system, that lie outside of civil society and importantly limit the scope of 
civil society action (Charney 1998). It might be noted that exactly parallel concerns animate 
liberal discussions about both the economy (e.g. the reliance on hidden hand argument to 
secure the public interest) and the public sphere (e.g. debates about the forms that public 
discussion and democracy should take).  
 
This fundamental dilemma poses two further difficulties. The first concerns the groups that 
constitute civil society. Liberal theory generally understands social forces in terms of 
organised social interests and encounters difficulties with groups organised on different 
socio-cognitive bases, such as race, tribe or religion. There are two aspects to this. One 
concerns groups that might threaten liberal ends and practices, and the other groups whose 
internal values and practices might be non-liberal (Kateb 1994; Chambers and Kopstein 
2001). This latter issue prompts questions as to the degree to which the liberal state may 
require social groups have the right kind of characteristics of internal organisation and values 
that will allow a liberal social order to work. The second difficulty concerns relations 
between the state and civil society generally labeled ‘accountability’, that is to say to what 
extent may civil society constrain and make demands of the public power and through what 
mechanisms (lobbying, electioneering etc). 
 
These tensions do not only merely reflect diversity within the liberal tradition, nor a failure of 
internal consistency, but rather the ‘political project’ at the heart of all liberal thought. The 
commitment to ‘civil society’ is genuine, in large part due to liberal anxieties about the power 
and scope of the state. But this commitment is hedged around by others, to certain kinds of 
market arrangements or individual rights for example, which suggest that what is really being 
advocated or defended is a particular kind of associational life relating in particular kinds of 
ways to the state. ‘Civil society’ is then at least in part a constructed realm as certain kinds of 
associational life are to be reworked or even eliminated, and other forms encouraged. Finally 
it implies that ‘civil society’ can play an important part in shaping the attitudes, mores and 
self-understanding of individuals who are to be encouraged to conceive of themselves and 
their relations with others and the state in particular kinds of ways. All of this, we suggest, is 
visible in the discourse and practice of western states and development agencies in their 
relations with African states. 
 
Development and ‘Civil Society’ 
Despite the importance of some notion of civil society within liberal thought its political 
deployment has of course varied with time and political circumstance. ‘Civil society’ first 
emerged within the policies of western development agencies in the late 1980s and early 
1990s as part of the broader ideas of ‘good governance’ and ‘democracy promotion’. Almost 
all major Western donors and development agencies have embraced the language of civil 
society (Williams 2011: chap 7). The World Bank has argued that a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs is an essential component of good governance (World Bank 
1994a). USAID has emphasized the importance of civil society in creating a democratic 
culture and particularly its role as a ‘counterbalance to the exercise of excessive authority by 
governments and economic and political elites’ (USAID 2009). DfID has stressed the role of 
civil society in enabling poor and marginalized groups to participate in decision-making and 
the role of civil society in providing goods and services to the poor (DfID nd). The liberal 
logic of the donor arguments is clear. In order for the state to provide the institutional and 
macroeconomic environment necessary for ‘development’ it must be made accountable for its 
actions. The state’s activities, then must be made as transparent as possible through the 
provision of information, a free press and public debate, and ‘civil society’ groups must be 
‘empowered’ so that they can play a key role in pressuring the state for better performance. 
‘Aware that they are being monitored by citizen groups, public officials know that they may 
be held accountable for budget discrepancies or failure to deliver adequate services’ (World 
Bank 2006a: vi).  
 
But donor discourse (and as we shall see practice) also reflects the ambiguities and tensions 
in the liberal understandings of ‘civil society’. There is a concern about whether civil society 
groups actually have the skills to enable them to hold governments to account: ‘the 
effectiveness of many initiatives is impaired by civil society’s lack of technical expertise in 
financial management and budgetary analysis’ (World Bank 2006: vii). This animates much 
of the concern with ‘capacity building’ for civil society. There is also a concern with limiting 
the scope of civil society: ‘in some spheres ... there can be little compromise. Family and 
ethnic ties that strengthen communal actions have no place in central government agencies 
where staff must be selected on merit, and public and private monies must not be confused’ 
(World Bank 1989: 60). As Pierre Landell-Mills (1992: 545) argued in a wonderfully clear 
articulation of the liberal project, ‘the challenge is to build on the elements that are 
compatible with modernization and development, [and reject] those that are not’. 
 
While these generalizations hold, political practice never simply follows some theoretical 
template as the term ‘liberal project’ reminds us. Even in liberal politics broadly defined 
there are strategic and tactical calculations to be made, goals and policies to be formulated 
and outcomes to be anticipated and assessed. The West and its agencies have not blindly 
pursued a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy in relation to civil society questions, nor are they anything 
like as simple-minded, unreflective, or impervious to criticism (provided it is conducive to 
the basic project of course) as much of the critical commentary tends to imply. For that 
reason it is illuminating to compare cases, not in the spirit of some positivist fetishism, but 
simply to illustrate the range of strategies, policies and debates that may be in play. Ghana 
and Sierra Leone are two relatively small West African countries (Ghana is about the size of 
Britain, Sierra Leone about the size of Scotland), both once British colonies, both once 
regarded as very promising candidates for independence. Both have suffered political 
turbulence in the form of coups and repression but whereas since 1992 Ghana has been 
politically stable Sierra Leone experienced vicious internal conflict between 1991 and 2002. 
 
Engineering civil society in Ghana 
Ghana has had substantial engagement with western donors for a long period of time, and 
donors are heavily involved in almost all aspects of Ghana’s social, economic and political 
life. The ‘promotion’ of civil society in Ghana as part of a strategy to improve governance 
has been a long-standing part of the overall strategy of western donors. In 2000 the then 
World Bank country director in Ghana said that the two main benefits of greater civil society 
involvement were the generation of feedback to help the public sector improve its 
performance and the improved accountability of government (Harrold 2000). The 2010 
Ghana growth strategy said that ‘the role of civil society as key stakeholders/partners in the 
development process is very crucial to achieving transparency and accountability’ (GoG 
2010: 123). In at least some respects Ghana does have a vibrant associational life. It has been 
estimated that there are 1000-3000 registered NGOs with a combined development 
expenditure of $150-200m (Danquahz 2011). In addition there are lots more informal 
associations, such as self-help and hometown associations and church-based organisations. 
Despite this the Bank argued that ‘participation by civil society in the management of public 
affairs has been constrained by the lack of access to information’, and the recent Ghana 
Shared Growth and Development Agenda has argued that there is ‘low participation of civil 
society in governance’ (World Bank 2004a: 21; GoG 2010: 122).  
 
Part of the donor strategy has been to encourage NGOs to play a more significant role. For 
example, the Public Financial Management Project was focused on improving the central 
government’s budget management and revenue collection processes, but it also had as one of 
its objectives the strengthening of ‘civil society’ involvement in the area of economic 
management (World Bank 2000: 3-4). This involved support for organizations within the 
Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (a ‘civil society’ organization), funding for a variety of 
initiatives to encourage the participation of civil society in the oversight of economic 
management, including providing training for the media so it can ‘play its watchdog role vis-
à-vis the fiscal and economic activities of the government’ (World Bank 2000: 4). We can 
also see this with a recent multi-donor funding mechanism to support civil society groups. 
STAR-Ghana (Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness) funded 
NGOs and civil society organisations operating in a number of areas, including the oil and 
gas industry, education, and supporting the 2012 election, with the aim of ‘improving the 
accountability and responsiveness of Ghana’s government, traditional authorities and the 
private sector’ (STAR-Ghana 2012).  
 
Ambiguities over the character of accountability, however, are revealed in other projects and 
programmes. The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy document says that ‘groups for 
consultation were selected based on their ability to build broad legitimacy for the GPRS. The 
groups were seen as partners whose support was felt to be necessary for the implementation 
of the GPRS’ (GoG 2003:5): In other words, groups that were thought to be important for its 
implementation (see also Kothari 2001). This is echoed elsewhere. An ODI report on DfID 
funding for civil society has said that ‘non-traditional’ civil society includes groups such as 
grassroots organisations, faith- based organisations, diasporas, the media and private-sector 
associations [are important for] … securing genuine, domestically-rooted support for a given 
policy direction (ODI 2007: 28). The 2010 growth strategy says that ‘the deepening of the 
process of promoting participation of stakeholders …  in the design and implementation of 
the national development agenda is an effective mechanism for promoting and consolidating 
broad national ownership. … Accordingly, the broad objective of policy will be to seek to 
promote and strengthen national ownership and achieve national consensus to ensure policy 
sustainability’ (GoG 2010: 128). It is hard to avoid the conclusion, not that Western donors 
do not really ‘want’ participation of civil society groups, but that such participation is 
designed to elicit the consent of certain kinds of groups to a development strategy that is 
significantly determined by the donors.3 In this way the ‘public interest’ (as understood by 
the donors) is guaranteed not by the participation of civil society groups, but by the broader 
pattern of donor influence on development policy. As Harrison has put it, ‘intervention is not 
exercised solely through conditionality and adjustment, but to a significant degree through 
closer involvement in state institutions and the employment of incentive finance’ (Harrison 
2004: 77).  
 
Some indication of what kinds of groups western donors consider to be ‘civil society’ is 
given by the kinds of organizations that ‘participated’ in the PRSP process. This 
‘participatory’ process had a number of elements. The process started with a national forum 
of stakeholders involved in poverty reduction activities including the government, NGOs, 
civil society and advocacy groups and donors. There then followed a more extensive 
consultative process involving 36 community groups, the Ghanaian media, the Trades Union 
Congress, student unions, professional bodies, representatives of women’s groups, NGOs and 
religious groups involved in service delivery, the Ghana Employers Association, research 
institutions, political parties and members of parliament (GoG 2003: 5-10).  It is clear from 
this document that the kinds of groups understood as being ones who can ‘participate’ are 
mostly ones organised around certain ‘interests’. In this sense the participatory process 
clearly operates with a particular view of what constitutes ‘civil society’ that excludes groups 
organised along different lines. The STAR-Ghana programme is not just about engineering 
accountability, by channeling funding to specific areas considered by the donors to be 
priorities (such as the oil and gas sector), but also evidences an attempt to engineer civil 
society itself. In particular, the STAR-Ghana funding programme has gender equality and 
social inclusion as core criteria for funding. Only those groups who have this as a stated aim 
will be allocated funding (STAR-Ghana 2012). 
 
This concern with engineering civil society is evident in a series of projects the World Bank 
has undertaken that in one way or another are attempting to reduce and/or rework the role of 
Traditional Authorities – the collection of Chiefs, Queens, Priests and other traditional 
authority figures whose role predates colonial rule and which still maintain considerable 
power and legitimacy in Ghana, particularly in rural areas (and one of the aims of STAR-
Ghana is to improve the ‘accountability and responsiveness’ of these traditional authorities). 
The relationship between these authorities and the state in Ghana has often been fraught, 
particularly in the immediate post-colonial period (Rathbone 2000). The 1992 Constitution 
protects Traditional Authorities but explicitly bars them from participating in party politics. 
The World Bank’s General Counsel expressed a series of reservation about traditional legal 
systems. While he accepted that these systems ‘help meet a fundamental need for justice’, he 
argued they had a number of problems. These include that fact that judgments are rarely 
recorded in writing and therefore can be ‘inconsistent and unpredictable’ and make appeal 
difficult; that customary laws ‘can be discriminatory against women, children and vulnerable 
minorities;’ and that the ‘training of officials of traditional tribunals in elements of procedure 
and human rights’ may be necessary to improve the fairness of customary law processes 
(Danino 2005). In 2003 the World Bank funded a Land Administration Project (World Bank 
2003). One element of the project supported the revision of laws and regulations regarding 
land ownership and administration. This was seen as particularly important precisely because 
there are a variety of different types of land tenure systems in Ghana, some tribal, clan, or 
family based often overseen by Traditional Authorities, some commercial, and some held by 
the state (see Kasanga and Kotey 2001). One expected outcome of this project is the 
development of a more efficient land market, which would ‘instill order and discipline to 
curb the incidence of land encroachment, unapproved development schemes, illegal land 
sales, and land racketeering’ (World Bank 2003: 6).  
 
A second Land Administration Project was developed to deal with the weakness and lack of 
transparency in the customary land tenure system. This project funded the establishment of 
customary land secretariats that will establish ‘minimum norms of transparency, respect for 
rights and quality control in documentation and record keeping’ (World Bank 2011a: 9-10). 
The Bank also funded a Promoting Partnerships with Traditional Authorities Project that ran 
from 2003-2006 (World Bank 2007a). In some respects it was a straightforward ‘capacity 
building’ project with various training programmes and workshops, and the provision of 
training to improve the financial and management ‘skills’ of Traditional Authorities. But the 
project also provided support for a review of traditional laws and the role of traditional courts 
and review the need to codify and revise customary law (it is notable that this element of the 
project comes under the heading of ‘preserving cultural heritage’). As the World Bank has 
said, ‘traditional authorities will be supported to assume a constructive role in national 
development and the modern nation-state, in particular in local land and judicial 
administration as well as in extra-judicial dispute settlement in conformity to the 
requirements of rule-of-law and national policies’. (World Bank 2007: 31) 
 Such social engineering is not limited to elites and reworking existing forms of association. 
Quite explicitly donors are constructing new social groups. Two Community Water and 
Sanitation Projects emphasized the provision of water and sanitation services to communities 
who were willing to contribute towards the capital costs and the operations and maintenance 
costs of water and sanitation facilities (World Bank 1994b; World Bank 2005). Recipient 
communities had to demonstrate that they could effectively operate, maintain and repair 
water facilities, collect revenue, keep records and accounts, and evaluate and resolve 
problems (World Bank 1994b: 38, 81). Communities were then expected to contribute 5-10% 
of the capital costs of the project, and levy and collect tariffs to pay for operations and 
maintenance (World Bank 1994:22-8; World Bank 2005). The idea of developing community 
organizations is also visible in the Community Based Rural Development Project (World 
Bank 2004b). In this case the project supports the development of rural infrastructure and the 
rehabilitation of community facilities, alongside capacity building for community based 
organizations (World Bank 2004b: 4-5). These organizations were given training in 
management, small enterprise development, ‘group dynamics’, planning, budgeting, record-
keeping, and managing back accounts (World Bank 2004b: 36).  
 
More recently the World Bank has developed a project that has as its central aim the 
development of social groups. This project, Building the Capacity of the Urban Poor for 
Inclusive Urban Development in Ghana, has as its aim ‘to strengthen the capacity of 
communities to actively engage in constructive, results-oriented public community dialogue’. 
It targets slum dwellers in Greater Accra. But this project is not providing the conditions for 
these groups to articulate their views, but rather about making groups in the first place. It is 
designed to mobilize communities to actively participate by establishing savings groups. In 
order to do this, local ‘leaders’ will be identified, and they will be given training in order to 
effectively ‘lead’ these newly created groups. They will be trained how to undertake 
‘effective engagement’ with local government officials and other stakeholders (World Bank 
2011b). 
 
Donor engagements with civil society in the Ghanaian case illustrate all the ambiguities and 
tensions we noted earlier. Civil society is important for ensuring accountability and 
improving the performance of the government. But, there are limits to the forms of 
accountability exercised by civil society, there is a clear understanding about the need to 
encourage certain attitudes and rework certain forms of association life such that they 
embody and pursue liberal norms (equality, transparency, rights). Finally, it is clear that the 
donors are building civil society, from the ground up, by encouraging the creation of certain 
kinds of groups, organized around certain kinds of economic and political engagements. 
 
Engineering civil society in Sierra Leone 
For all sorts of reasons the civil society project in Sierra Leone has been more problematic 
than in Ghana largely due to a much greater degree of instability and violence. During the 
1960s and 1970s the state was massively informalised, political activity of any kind was 
circumscribed, and economic decline, exacerbated by corruption and smuggling, was almost 
continual.  This situation precipitated an uprising by the Revolutionary United Front, noted 
for its highly destructive tactics, which resulted in a decade-long and immensely damaging 
internal war. The end of that war in 2002 saw very extensive involvement by the 
‘international community’ in the country which was also characterised by new modalities, for 
example, formal agreements as to expected policy and institutional changes, and long term 
aid commitments, with an unusually high concentration of resources on ‘governance’ issues. 
Civil society issues have been posed on the terrain of ‘peace building’, a combination of 
terminating conflict, re-establishing order and creating the conditions that will prevent a 
return to conflict (Paris 2010). But the peace building agenda both signifies greater ambition 
on the part of outside agencies and also commits them, to deeper analytic engagement with, 
and to deeper intrusions into, target societies. 
 
Despite these very different circumstances, donor documents for Sierra Leone also stress the 
involvement of civil society in recent developments in the country, hailing for example its 
role in bringing about peace and stability. Support for civil society is embedded in specific 
programmes such as the Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project as well as a 
whole series of decentralization projects (World Bank JAS and World Bank PRSP). In these 
and other documents consultation with ‘civil society organisations’ is constantly emphasised. 
The desirability of making public participation a major feature of the post-war recovery 
process has been stressed by the Sierra Leone government itself as well as international 
donors and was inscribed in the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) (GoSL, 
2001) and later the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of 2005–2007 (GoSL, 2005), as 
well as other documents notably the Sierra Leone Vision 2025 (GoSL, 2003), which noted 
that,  ‘another critical political challenge is putting in place sound state governance systems 
that allow for popular participation and social inclusion, accountability, efficiency, as well as 
building capacity to manage the development process’ (2003: p. 34). Yet despite the (it must 
be said, rather bland and formulaic) rhetoric of these documents, projects and programmes, 
on closer analysis even they (and certainly many others) exhibit all the ambiguities and 
tensions about civil society earlier identified. 
 
It is clear that the room for debate about the ‘public interest’ is substantially constrained, if 
not exhaustively defined, by the donors and international organisations. The drafting of Sierra 
Leone’s PRSP in 2004 involved a fairly extensive process of consultation and the 
participation of civil society organisations in the process was coordinated by an international 
NGO, ActionAid Sierra Leone with financial support from DFID. But the main conduit for 
support for Sierra Leone civil society has been the (rather bizarrely named) ENCISS 
(Enhancing the Interface between Civil Society and The State to Improve Poor People’s 
Lives), an organisation largely funded by DFID whose stated purpose is ‘to increase the 
capacity of civil societies to participate in, influence, contribute to and monitor the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy’ (ENCISS 2009: ix). In effect civil society comprises organisations which 
accept the premises and content of the PRSP, a document not noticeably different from many 
other such documents. It is generally agreed that there has been extremely little parliamentary 
oversight or engagement in the PRSP process in Sierra Leone and that much of its content 
derives from the agendas of donors.  As one Sierra Leonean Government official suggested, 
‘[t]he World Bank had targets in their country strategy, and we incorporated these into the 
PRSP strategy. At that time there was no MDBS (Multi-donor budget support), but the 
European Commission had a number of targets, and we incorporated those too’ (EURODAD 
2008: 16). 
 
Nonetheless within these rather strict parameters the donors have not been insensitive to local 
circumstances especially concerning relations between state institutions and the wider 
society. Perhaps the major issue confronting post-conflict Sierra Leone was how far 
dysfunctional local institutions, notably rural chieftaincy had caused the conflict and, if so, 
what should be done about it. Whatever misgivings there were about the chiefs the 
imperatives of restoring order led DFID to fund a Paramount Chiefs Restoration Programme 
to reestablish basic administration and to signal to the population that it was safe to return to 
their villages. At the same time DFID was mindful of the dangers of abuse of powers by 
chiefs (there was after all a long colonial history of this) and organized consultation meetings 
for local people as well as issuing a revised code of conduct for chiefs and their employees. 
Since then the debate has rumbled on, both in academic publications and policy circles, about 
the legitimacy and utility of chieftaincy, one view asserting that the roots of the conflict lay in 
a broken patron-clientelist system in which chiefs increasingly used their ‘traditional’ power 
illegitimately to extort labour and other resources from young men, and interpreting the 
conflict as ‘a long deferred revolt of the rural under-class welled up, led by intransigent 
youth’ (Richards 2005: 588). On this analysis if the conflict is not to recur, the old 
chieftaincy system must ultimately disappear. A rather different view has suggested that 
much of the oppressive picture is no longer plausible, but that the institution of chieftaincy 
remains rooted in daily life and still retains considerable popular approval. On this account 
‘the fundamental challenge,’ would then be, ‘to make chieftaincy relevant in Sierra Leone in 
the 21st Century’ (Fanthorpe 2009). 
 
Such considerations informed the promotion of an alternative model of local governance 
rooted in the idea of the decentralization of government powers to Local Councils (Zhou 
2009). Under strong donor pressure and with support from the UNDP and the World Bank a 
new Local Government Act created a structure of district councils responsible for providing a 
wide range of services, devolved from central government, while the chiefdoms continued to 
perform other essential local functions, notably the administration of customary land rights, 
revenue collection and the maintenance of local law and order. The councils were dependent 
for their revenues either on transfers from the centre or on taxes collected by the chiefdoms.  
The Local Government legislation was ambiguous about the relationship between the 
Councils and the Chiefs and for reformers this presented the danger that the Councils would 
become dependent on either the central state or the chiefs. Such institutions require of course 
the presence of modern civil society as conventionally understood and such groups attracted 
funding from the donors as part of the strategy. 
 
It might be suggested that the international engagement with Sierra Leone, in the particular 
circumstances of the country and especially with the overwhelming need to restore basic state 
functions, has generated not one but two sets of discourses and policies about civil society. 
On the one hand there is a (more or less reluctant) acceptance of the existence of traditional 
groups and attendant modes of administration and forms of law enforcement. This can be 
seen in the tolerance of the chieftaincy system but also in a much more analytically open 
stance to what actually exists on the ground. World Bank studies, for example, openly 
acknowledge the conceptual difficulties in applying notions like civil society to much of 
Sierra Leone, and deploy such labels as ‘traditional’ civil society and ‘formal’ civil society 
and are not unaware that these categories are not water tight (World Bank 2007b). In the 
same vein the Bank has placed considerable emphasis on investigating what modes of rule 
and dispute resolution people actually use (World Bank 2006b). 
 
A second stream of debate and policy concerns civil society more conventionally understood 
and especially its ability to hold the state ‘accountable’. Here there is considerable 
skepticism. Report after report suggests that, ‘it is clear from interviews carried out that local 
CSOs tend to be weak. Many will only participate in activities for which they are sponsored 
or paid. Lack of an organized community oversight role could weaken transparency and 
accountability within Councils’ or that, ‘while it [ENCISS] has had some success conducting 
public opinion surveys, producing databases on local development activity, hosting 
workshops and radio discussion programs and resolving local disputes between citizen 
groups, it has yet to develop a broader strategy for state-society engagement’, indeed that 
ENCISS’ own staff concede that, ‘there is little organised civil society that is not donor 
driven’ (Oxford Policy management 2007; International Crisis Group 2008: 13,  15). There is 
a constant lament as to the weakness of civil society and the need to reshape it to more 
adequately carry out its role. No-one knows better than external donors how dependent civil 
society is on outside funding. In Sierra Leone the CIVICUS survey found that, ‘it is clear in 
the research findings that CSOs are overwhelmingly reliant on donor support for 
implementing their various programmes (CIVICUS n.d.: 5). As these examples suggest 
‘accountability’ requires not merely a vibrant civil society and an open responsive 
government but the right kind of relationship between them. They have to see each other as it 
were and this mutual visibility does not simply emerge on the ground but has to be 
laboriously constructed. 
 
Such profound engagement with the internal fabric of other societies poses the question of 
the degree to which liberal states may interfere in other states to bring about the right kind of 
civil society. This is by no means restricted to Africa (and has been an essential part of the 
construction of liberal capitalism everywhere) but the issues are perhaps particularly stark in 
contemporary Africa. At its simplest this involves continuing to sponsor ‘modern’ civil 
society groupings while also exploring what kinds of arrangements can be made with 
‘traditional’ forms to draw them into the development process. It is clear from the 
participation of religious and faith-based groups in the PRSP process, for example, that 
Western donors are not operating with a strict secular-liberal account of ‘civil society’ in 
either Ghana or Sierra Leone. On the other hand there are limits to the extent to which 
Western agencies are prepared to tolerate divergence from their own understandings of what 
are appropriate (liberal) social institutions. Traditional Authorities are not seen as ‘bad’ per 
se; indeed they are seen as being potentially important in the delivery of social services. 
Rather, where the social practices of these Authorities diverges from certain liberal 
understandings (legal norms, land markets) they are to be reformed. 
 
In both streams there appears to be a kind of two-pronged strategy on the one hand to 
inculcate good (liberal) practices and on the other to at least gradually eliminate bad 
(illiberal) practices. It is hardly controversial to suggest that in many African countries the 
conduct of many civil society organisations is characterized by authoritarianism, lack of 
transparency and so on. As the NGO Civicus noted in a recent workshop in Freetown,’ 
CIVICUS’ Civil Society Index (CSI) findings show that there have been high levels of 
financial mismanagement within civil society organisations, as well as weak internal 
governance and gender equity. Action must be taken to improve public trust and the 
credibility of the NGO sector.4 Effectively the elites of civil society organisations must be 
trained to conduct themselves properly. 
 
This leaves a considerable field for bad attitudes and practices. In Sierra Leone ‘the levels of 
social tolerance, particularly towards people living with HIV/AIDS, homosexuals and people 
of a different race remain low’ (CIVICUS n.d.: 9). Much of the policy literature, despite its 
often emollient tone, makes it clear that these are in many ways pathological societies which 
simply need to be fundamentally transformed. It is here that the notion of ‘civil society’ is 
stretched to breaking point. Part of the Civicus survey comprises a ‘sub-dimension [which] 
defines the extent to which the existing socio-cultural norms and attitudes are favourable or 
detrimental for civil society’ (50). Here civil society ceases to have any connection with a 
particular society and becomes rather a template against which any such society is to be 
measured. But even in the ‘real world’ there is a sense in which civil society is quite literally 
to be created. It is a constant refrain in the literature on Sierra Leone that women and youth 
must be empowered or emancipated with the constant (though usually unstated) assumption 
that this will be done by outside forces. It is clear also that the role of civil society is not to 
reflect the wider society but to inform and reshape it though this also is rarely made explicit. 
‘CSOs educate the public on the environment, human rights, gender equality, good 
governance – accountability and transparency, corruption, decentralisation, poverty 
eradication or alleviation, respectively’ (CIVICUS n.d.: 77). 
 
The patent absurdity of this sort of utilisation of ‘civil society’ in large part explains the fairly 
rapid disillusionment with the concept in more academic writing about Africa, which though 
it struggles to anticipate, track, indeed inform the demands of liberal states and agencies, is 
under some obligation to observe social realities and to demonstrate at least a degree of 
attachment to coherent reasoning. There was informed scepticism from early on (Kasfir 
1998) and then a growing tide of findings that suggested that African civil society not only 
had weak links to the populations it supposedly represented, little internal democracy and 
remained subordinate to Western agencies and their agendas, but in many ways was 
positively dysfunctional in its tendencies to create new forms of inequality, promoting 
clientelism and corruption amongst leaders, and even weakening the capacity for collective 
action (Booth 2010).5 At the risk of simplifying a complex picture liberal social science 
found that what was actually there it did not like and what it would like was not there.  
 
Conclusion: Civil Society and the Liberal Project in Africa 
These rather general arguments would clearly benefit from further elaboration in a number of 
directions. One we have already explored a little ourselves namely the obvious historical 
parallels between the contemporary and the colonial periods (Williams and Young 2009). 
The study of the latter has tended to be dominated by perspectives that see colonialism as 
almost entirely deviant from the liberal tradition and which have endlessly obscured the 
degree to which colonial rule was committed to projects of social change that were never 
reducible to oppression and exploitation. The crucial difference is of course that colonial 
rulers, however constrained by the limits of ‘hegemony on a shoestring’ (Berry 1993), did 
have some local means of enforcement whereas the modern armies of progress and 
development are perforce constrained to promote social change ‘at a distance’. That 
difference acknowledged however, one aspect of colonial rule, the divisions between officials 
of different types and backgrounds, as well as the tensions between them and missionary 
endeavour and capitalist enterprise, points in another direction as yet poorly understood with 
a strong contemporary resonance. This would involve exploring not only the agendas of 
modernisation (the high politics as it were) but the gaps between organizations, between 
policy and outcomes, between politics and ‘development’, between states and NGOs as a way 
towards a more nuanced understanding of the ‘liberal project’ in the twenty-first century. 
 
A second though linked area, worthy of further scrutiny, is the degree to which, and in 
response to what factors, the priorities and practices of western donors shift over time, and 
the effects of such changes on civil society support programmes. In Ghana, for example, it is 
clear that western donors are very animated about the potential impact of significance oil and 
gas revenues on Ghanaian politics (unsurprisingly given experiences elsewhere in Africa). As 
the STAR-Ghana programmes shows, civil society organisations are understood to play a part 
in ensuring transparency in this area, but it is also clear that donors are attempting to bind the 
Ghanaian state in other ways too. This is evident in the raft of projects targeting the 
budgeting and spending mechanisms of the state, and the capacity of the relevant government 
departments. It is also evident in attempts to commit the state to participation in international 
regimes, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and the anti-money 
laundering regimes. This suggests that while civil society is an important part of the liberal 
project in Ghana, donors are flexible and adaptive when it comes to the best mechanisms for 
ensuring the instantiation of liberal ends and practices. 
 
In Sierra Leone also donors (and their academic advisers) have not been slow to consider 
other strategies. One follows from the idea that donors should engage in further manipulation 
of the institutional architectures they have largely set up, and intervene, for example, in the 
structure of relations between central and local government. As one of the leading advocates 
of this approach has it, ‘the World Bank should re-focus its activities in a way to direct far 
more resources directly to the L[ocal] C[ouncil]s. The basic aim of this is not just to make 
LCs better resourced and to allow them to provide services properly, but also to empower 
them’ (Robinson 2010). The thinking here is that strengthening local government may 
provide a counter balance to central government and particularly the tendency towards the 
centralisation of resources. This would also connect with a development of ‘modern’ civil 
society strategy at the local level. Elsewhere the same author has suggested that beyond 
resources, outside agencies need to take account of political realities, of the interests of elites 
and individual politicians, and seek to create ‘incentives’ for such individuals to continue to 
support reform processes (Robinson 2008). 
 
Such ideas appear more bluntly in responses from expatriate advisers and officials ‘on the 
ground’ who often argue that critical to the success of their projects is the support of ‘key 
individuals’ to drive through reforms, policies and directives.6 Successes in the Sierra Leone 
Ministries of Finance and Health were attributed to having a small number of committed 
individuals, perhaps as few as five, in key positions. Often, but not always, the individuals 
concerned were returning highly qualified and experienced Sierra Leoneans from the 
Diaspora on augmented salaries or seconded international staff and most often a combination 
of the two. More than one respondent suggested that the ultimate key individual is President 
Koroma himself. The situation was sometimes characterised as ‘lighthouse politics: when the 
president shone his light on a policy, it began to work. The job of the donors was to regulate 
the light. Alternatively when Sierra Leonean politics is actively focused on elections, for 
example, it was widely conceded, that the reform process would tread water as other factors, 
regional, ethnic, and party political come into play. 
 
However bluntly expressed, what might be called this ‘man-on-the-spot’ realism now appears 
to be receiving acknowledgement in more theoretically sophisticated forums. In recent years 
there seems to have been a greater recognition that donor strategies in Africa have been rather 
too driven by a commitment to instantiating liberal ends and arrangements in Africa. Some 
considerable doubt, if not complete loss of faith, has been cast on civil society strategies, 
even within the World Bank. There is much more talk about the necessity of paying attention 
to local contexts, of ‘going with the grain’ of African societies, and thinking about what kind 
of governance would be ‘good enough’ (Bunse and Verena 2012; Kelsall 2008; 2011; 
Grindle 2007; 2011).  In the light of a more general reassessment of donor strategies, it has 
been argued that the ‘better governance that Africa needs is not so easily identified with the 
usual concept of ‘good governance’ (Booth 2012: 2; for a more general reassessment see Lin 
2012). There is little doubt that a more rigorous and informed analysis of the actual modes of 
governance and forms of associational life in African states would be an important step in 
developing more nuanced strategies. The question this poses for the major donors, however, 
is whether and to what extent they are prepared to substantially modify their liberal 
understandings of governance and civil society in future aid policies. As long as they do not, 
then the kinds of ambiguities and tensions we have identified will continue to characterise 
western agencies pursuit of a liberal project in Africa. 
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End notes 
 
1 This chapter is an expanded and revised version of an article published as David Williams and Tom Young, 
‘Civil Society and the Liberal Project in Ghana and Sierra Leone’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 6, 
1 (2012), pp. 7-22. 
2 See the subtle discussion in Taylor 1995: chaps 11 and 13. 
3  It is wrong to think of the Ghanaian government as passive in this process, but rather than being committed to 
the participatory process as a way of developing a better development strategy, it has been argued that the 
government saw the process as a necessary one to gain debt relief under the HIPIC initiative and mobilize 
additional donor funds (Whitfield 2010) 
4 See http://civilsocietyindex.wordpress.com/2010/10/29/cso-accountability-workshop-in-sierra-leone/, accessed 
27 September 2011. 
5 For sceptical commentary more broadly see Encarnación 2006. 
6  This section draws on research recently embarked on by Tom Young and Dr. David Harris of Bradford 
University 
